👩‍⚕️TMC Case Conference Group⚕️Interactive Learning 👨‍⚕️

🏥 Disease Spreading Game 🩺

The Invisible Chain — see how infections move, how outbreaks grow, and where prevention can break the chain.

How to play: Press Start. Watch the coloured particles. Change one setting at a time, predict what will happen, then test your prediction. Use the glossary whenever an epidemiological term is unfamiliar.

An educational, stochastic model—not a forecast, clinical decision tool, or substitute for disease-specific public-health guidance. All baseline numbers are illustrative.

1. Watch the invisible chain

Susceptible (S) Exposed (E) Infectious (I) Recovered (R) Vaccinated (V)

Ready. Press Start to begin the simulation.

2. Outbreak dashboard

0Susceptible
0Exposed
0Infectious
0Recovered
0Vaccinated
0Ever infected

Population status

Infected at least once
Currently infectious

Simulation time: 0 steps

Observed transmissions: 0

Mean secondary cases per infectious case: —

The final mean is descriptive of this simulation run, not a reliable estimate of real-world R₀ or Rₜ.

3. Design the experiment

Change one variable at a time for a fair comparison. Contact distance is a visual proxy for opportunities to interact, not a measured clinical distance.

4. Epidemic curve

New exposures per step Currently infectious

This teaching curve uses simulation steps, not calendar days. Real epidemic curves may use symptom-onset dates, diagnosis dates, or report dates; those are not interchangeable.

5. Transmission chain

The most recent simulated transmission events. In real outbreaks, who infected whom is often uncertain.

  1. No transmissions yet.
Look for: chains that stop, clusters of cases, and whether interventions break onward transmission.

6. Debrief: what did this run teach?

Run the simulation to generate a debrief. Repeat the same settings several times to see how chance affects the outcome.

Questions for the conference

  1. Did the outbreak grow, stall or die out?
  2. Which change had the largest effect on this run?
  3. Would this model represent a respiratory ward, a village, or neither without further changes?
  4. What data would be needed to calibrate it to a real outbreak?

7. On-demand epidemiology notes

Open any topic for a concise definition, a clinical example and an interpretation caution.

Pathogen, exposure, infection and infectiousness

Pathogen: an agent that causes disease. Exposure: contact with a possible source. Infection: establishment or multiplication of the agent in a host. Infectiousness: ability to transmit infection at a particular time.

Clinical example: exposure to an infected person does not guarantee infection; infection may occur without symptoms.

In this game: a particle may come close to an infectious particle, but transmission is probabilistic.

Incubation period, latent period and infectious period

Incubation period: infection to symptom onset. Latent period: infection to becoming infectious. Infectious period: the time during which transmission can occur.

These are distinct. A person can become infectious before symptoms appear. The model's latent and infectious durations are simplified step counts, not disease-specific clinical estimates.

R₀ and Rₜ — reproduction numbers

R₀ is the average number of secondary infections caused by an infectious person in a fully susceptible population under specified conditions. Rₜ is the corresponding average at a particular time, given current immunity, behaviour and interventions.

Values above 1 can support epidemic growth; sustained values below 1 generally indicate decline. These are population-level concepts—not the number of contacts of one particular person. Do not equate the game's observed average with a formal estimate of R₀ or Rₜ.

Transmissibility, virulence, severity and mortality

Transmissibility concerns spread. Severity concerns how ill people become. Virulence describes the capacity to cause harm. Mortality describes deaths in a population; the case-fatality ratio is deaths among identified cases over a specified period.

A disease that spreads widely is not automatically the disease with the highest fatality ratio.

Incidence, prevalence and attack rate

Incidence concerns new cases over time. Prevalence concerns all existing cases at a point or over a period. Attack rate is commonly the proportion of an at-risk group that becomes ill during an outbreak; despite its name, it is usually a cumulative incidence proportion.

Endemic, epidemic, pandemic and outbreak

Endemic: usual or expected presence in an area or population. Epidemic: occurrence above what is expected. Pandemic: an epidemic spread across countries or continents, affecting many people. Outbreak: a cluster or increase in cases that warrants investigation; it is often used for a more localised event.

Superspreading and overdispersion

Transmission is often uneven: many infected people may transmit to few or no others, while a small number transmit to many. Overdispersion describes this extra variation. Crowding, timing, behaviour, environment and pathogen factors may contribute.

This game includes random variation, but it does not implement a validated disease-specific overdispersion model.

Herd immunity and vaccination

Population immunity can reduce the number of susceptible people and interrupt transmission chains. Vaccines differ in their effects on infection, infectiousness and severe disease. Protection may wane, and effectiveness varies by vaccine, pathogen and population.

Here, initially vaccinated particles are protected from infection for simplicity. This is an educational assumption, not a claim that any real vaccine gives complete protection.

Isolation, quarantine and contact tracing

Isolation separates people who are infected from others. Quarantine restricts movement or contact for people who may have been exposed, according to applicable public-health guidance. Contact tracing identifies and follows up people who may have been exposed.

The isolation switch in this model reduces movement and contacts for infectious particles. It does not model every practical or ethical consideration of isolation policies.

Transmission routes: why one model cannot fit all diseases
  • Respiratory: inhalation of infectious aerosols and/or exposure to respiratory particles at close range, depending on the pathogen and setting.
  • Direct or indirect contact: physical contact or contaminated objects/surfaces where relevant.
  • Faecal–oral / waterborne: pathogens reach a new host through contaminated food or water.
  • Vector-borne: a vector such as a mosquito transmits the pathogen.
  • Zoonotic: transmission from animals to humans; some infections can then spread between people.

The animated engine here models simplified proximity-based respiratory transmission. Dengue needs a mosquito–human cycle; cholera needs a food/water contamination pathway. They should not be simulated with the same engine without those mechanisms.

Nipah: why high consequence does not mean unrestricted spread

Nipah is a zoonotic infection that can cause severe neurological and respiratory disease. Spillover may involve infected animals or contaminated food, and human-to-human transmission has been documented, including in healthcare settings.

For teaching, distinguish spillover, close-contact transmission, severity and the success of contact follow-up. This game's Nipah selection uses a lower illustrative contact-transmission probability; it is not calibrated to a particular outbreak and does not model animal or food exposure.

Use current WHO and national public-health guidance for real-world precautions. Do not infer individual risk from this toy simulation.

Epidemic curve and surveillance data

An epidemic curve displays cases by time, often by symptom onset. The shape can help investigators consider outbreak patterns and timing, but it does not prove a transmission route or identify the source by itself.

Observed cases can be fewer than actual infections because of testing access, care-seeking, case definitions and reporting delays. The simulated curve has none of these surveillance complications.

Model limitations: what is missing?

This teaching model simplifies mixing, immunity, infectiousness, interventions and time. It does not include age-specific susceptibility, realistic households, travel, healthcare pathways, pathogen evolution, reinfection, waning immunity, diagnostic delays or a calibrated statistical model.

Its purpose is to build intuition and prompt questions—not to forecast outbreaks, compare real diseases quantitatively, or guide treatment or public-health operations.

8. Disease library: choose the right lesson

Measles

Highly transmissible respiratory infection. Discuss immunity gaps, vaccination and how susceptible clusters can sustain spread.

Influenza

Discuss seasonal spread, vaccination, changing susceptibility and household or workplace contacts.

COVID-19

Discuss pre-symptomatic transmission, ventilation, changing immunity, testing and isolation.

Nipah

Discuss zoonotic spillover, close-contact transmission, high consequences, healthcare precautions and contact tracing. This simplified preset is not an outbreak forecast.

Dengue

Requires a mosquito–human transmission cycle. Human-to-human proximity alone should not transmit dengue in a scientifically faithful model.

Cholera

Requires contaminated food/water or an environmental reservoir pathway; clean water and sanitation are central interventions.

Scope: The four selectable scenarios share one simplified respiratory engine. The disease names are teaching prompts, not validated parameterisations. Dengue and cholera are included to highlight why different diseases require different models.

9. Suggested conference challenge

  1. Run a baseline outbreak with no vaccination or interventions.
  2. Reset, vaccinate 50% of the population and compare cumulative infections.
  3. Reset and enable isolation. What changes in the transmission chain?
  4. Repeat identical runs. How much do outcomes vary?
  5. Explain why these results cannot directly predict an outbreak in a real hospital or community.

Take-home message: infectious disease spread is shaped by biology, contacts, immunity, environment and public-health action. Visible chains help us reason—but sound decisions also need reliable data, uncertainty estimates and context.